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THE DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
Besides offering general rationales for the legal recognition 
and enforcement of agreements (Romani, 1984), and seeking to 
explain particular rules and concepts used in contract law (Harris 
and Veljanovski, 1984), economic and social studies in the field 
of contract have also offered information and explanations about 
the use of contracts, or of given types of contracts. This paper 
aims to be a contribution to this class of contract literature: 
it is based on a study of the incidence, design and performance of 
long-term contracts ("LTCs") in the world iron ore market over 
the last 15-20 years. (1) The paper should be seen as a by­
product of the study, whose main purpose is to produce information 
about effects of employing long-term contracts which may have 
practical relevance for policy-making in the field of 
international trade in primary commodities. It starts from the 
assumption that instability in such trade, in terms of wide and 
rapid changes in prices or quantities, has deleterious effects 
both for importers and exporters, and particularly for developing 
country exporters of such commodities. The acceptance of this 
view by policy-makers has since the Second World War led to the 
introduction of a variety of measures to stabilise markets or 
alleviate the effects of instability, requiring the intervention 
of governments or of international agencies in the operation of 



























































































compensatory finance. It may be, however, that governmental 
interventions could be reduced, or could operate more effectively, 
if parties were to contribute to the stabilisation of their own 
trading environment through appropriate contractual arrangements. 
What is appropriate may vary with the commodity: futures markets
may help in the case of homogeneous products with unambiguous 
prices, but are unlikely to develop where these qualities are 
absent (Streit, 1980). The initial assumption of the study was 
that, in the absence of such qualities, long-term contracts could 
have this stabilising effect. Testing this assumption has 
involved the construction of indices of stability of iron ore 
prices and quantities for each major exporting and importing 
country over the study period and over sub-periods within that 
time, and relating the results to the extent to which the iron ore 
trade of different countries at different times was conducted 
under long-term contracts, as opposed to being carried out on a 
short-term or spot basis. Simultaneously it has involved
examining the contents of as wide a range of possible of long-term 
contracts, in order to check for significant variations (for 
example in the degree of price or quantity flexibility offered) 
over time and space; and examining performance of these 
contracts. These detailed investigations of contract terms and 
behaviour are vital to the correct interpretation of the
statistical data. To take an extreme case, if it appeared that 
long-term contracts did not in fact constrain party behaviour in 
such matters as prices or quantities to any significant extent, 




























































































and market stability would have to be sought among factors other 
than the legal relation installed.
Two lines of development in the contract literature already 
referred to are of particular relevance to this investigation and 
may, in turn, be furthered by its findings. The first is
concerned with the use of long-term contract as a link in the 
production chain. It considers when and why enterprises rely on 
such contracts for the procurement of materials or semi-finished 
goods, in preference to other forms of economic organisation such 
as backward integration (ownership of supply facilities) or short­
term contracts; and also considers what the results of such 
reliance might be. This kind of discussion has perhaps been
furthest advanced in the writings of Williamson, whose work on
employment (1975), inflation (1978) and firm structure (especially 
vertical integration) (1971, 1975) has more recently led him to
attempt to identify relationships between certain forms of
contract and a characterisation of economic relations in terms of 
uncertainty, recurrence of transactions, and specificity of 
related investment (1979).
Drawing on the work of McNeil (1974, 1978, and see also 
1981), who has developed the notion of "relational contracting" as 
counterweight and contrast to the "discrete single transaction" 
contract model of classical contract law and neoclassical
economics, Williamson arranges contract forms along a spectrum 
ranging from the classical model at one end to what he calls 




























































































expects to find classical contracting, as an expression of market 
governance, efficiently associated with recurrent or occasional 
transactions where no buyer-specific supplier investments are 
involved; where, however, investment is, or becomes, highly 
specific to transactions between the supplier and a given buyer 
("idiosyncratic"), and these transactions are recurrent, 
Williamson expects to see "unified governance" occurring. As 
might be imagined, the area of greatest interest lies somewhere 
between these two extremes: here Williamson distinguishes a class 
of investment of mixed non-specific and idiosyncratic character 
(for example where the object of transaction is "customized" 
equipment or material) and suggests that occasional transactions 
of this type may be best subjected to "trilateral governance" 
contracts which make provision for third party determination of 
disputes, as by architects, arbitrators etc., while recurrent 
transactions may be the object of "bilateral governance", that is 
to say, of contracts or sequences of contracts which the parties 
will themselves take pains to maintain and to adjust to changing 
circumstances.
While the transaction-specific character of the investment, 
leading to its greatly reduced value in other applications, is the 
main factor which explains these departures from a classical 
contract model in which significant breach of contract terms leads 
naturally to litigation, or termination, or both, Williamson also 
attaches importance to other elements such as economies in 
communication costs between the parties (in terms of both 




























































































relation continues. Finally, given our concern with market 
stability, we should notice Williamson's view that within the 
framework of "bilateral governance" (which, I shall argue, is most 
relevant to the long-term contracts under examination), 
adjustments to contract quantities are normally much less 
problematic than adjustments to prices. He bases this both on the 
general observation that
"price adjustments have an unfortunate zero-sum quality, 
whereas proposals to increase, decrease, or delay 
delivery do not" (1979: 251)
and on the idea that where the product is specialised, the costs 
involved in switching supplies mean that there is little risk of 
opportunistic quantity adjustments, by buyers who have found 
cheaper suppliers elsewhere or sellers who have found better sales 
opportunities.
The characteristics of the iron ore market make it an 
excellent arena in which to work over Williamson's theories.(2) 
Iron ore is an indispensable raw material for steel-making. You 
cannot make steel without it: at the same time there is virtually 
no other use for iron ore. Deposits of ore are distributed 
throughout the world. Broadly speaking, ore is sold in three 
broad categories: lumps, fines, and pellets. Lumps, as the name 
indicates, are lumps of ore, from pea-size up, which can be used 
directly in the iron furnace. Fines are smaller particles, which 
require to be sintered, that is, fused by heat, before they can be 
so used. By reason of the fragility of sinter, sintering normally 





























































































recently thought it worthwhile to construct sintering works in the 
Phillipines to process Australian fines before onward carriage to 
Japan. Obviously lumps are a higher value product, but they can 
only be produced by mines with an ore body of sufficient purity. 
Pellets are a bonded form of ore, sometimes manufactured at the 
mine, which contains additives and generally reduces processing 
costs at the furnace stage. Pelletisation is one solution to the 
marketing of ore from a low-grade but large and easy-to-work body 
of ore; the construction of pelleting plant, however, involves 
substantial additional investment. It is quite possible for 
individual steel-makers to vary their inputs as between lumps, 
pellets and sintered fines, though process readjustment costs will 
be incurred in the substitution of one type of ore for another, 
and in particular, steel-makers will hesitate before closing down 
their own sintering plant in order to use lumps or pellets.
In addition to these differences in physical presentation, 
ores from different mines will vary widely in terms of chemical 
composition. A key factor is obviously the richness of the ore, 
that is, the percentage of iron (Fe), and prices will normally be 
expressed on the basis of minimum and normal percentages of Fe per 
ton, or at so many cents per Fe percentage unit per ton. The 
presence of other elements such as manganese, alumina and silica, 
and their relative quantities in the ore, and of impurities such 
as phosphorous and sulphur, will also be important. Each steel­
maker's facilities will operate best on a particular chemical 




























































































provenance and composition in order to maintain this mix. Two 
steel-makers with similar quantitative needs may thus be prepared 
to pay significantly different prices for the same cargo of ore.
This pronounced physical and chemical differentiation of the 
product by reference to the needs of individual buyers has 
prevented the emergence of reference grades, standards or 
contracts on which a commodity exchange type of trading could be 
based. Also militating against this type of open trading (and 
hence against stabilisation through futures markets) are the low 
value per ton of the product, the high costs of storage and, due 
to the evolution of the market in terms of the location of buyers
and sellers, the high proportion of prices represented by
freights. In 1982, for example, the price of 65 per cent Fe
Brazilian ore c .i .f . at North Sea ports was $25.90 per tonne,
while spot freights per cargo tonne for this journey averaged 
$5.40, a relatively low figure.
The steel industry, as already noted, is the iron ore 
industry's only significant customer. It grew up, first in 
Western Europe and later in the United States, round workable 
deposits of iron ore and coal. Steel mills controlled their own 
iron ore sources. There was little commercial trading in iron 
ore, and virtually none on an inter-regional basis. This
situation continued until after the Second World War, from which 
time the depletion of US and West European ore reserves, and the 




























































































ore supplies, caused a rapid expansion of new sources of supply, 
with the exploitation of reserves in India, West Africa, Brazil 
and Australia. In 1955, 85 per cent of iron ore production took 
place in Europe, the United States and Canada; by 1977 this
proportion had fallen to under 55 per cent. Most of the growth in
this period has been in Australia and Brazil. In 1955 these two 
countries together accounted for under 2 per cent of world
production and 3 per cent of exports. By 1980 these figures had 
risen, respectively, to 20 and 40 per cent. Trade in ore from 
these new sources has very largely - though not exclusively - been 
conducted with the Western countries, Japan, and one or two "new" 
steel-making countries like Korea. Despite a large increase, over 
the period since 1955, in its steel production, both in absolute 
terms and as a proportion of world production, the Communist world 
has remained self-sufficient in iron ore, East Europe drawing on 
steadily expanding Russian supplies and China being self-
sufficient .
To summarise, with a first attempt at relating these facts to 
Williamson's transactions categories, we may say that this is a 
market of recurrent transactions in which there is a significant, 
but perhaps not determining, degree of investment specialisation. 
In such circumstances we might expect to find classical market 
contracting and relational contracting with bilateral governance 
as competing models for the industry. Also to be taken into 
account, however, is the virtually closed character of the market 




























































































alternative product - and the very small number of actual, and 
even potential, participants in that market. One of them has 
described the ore market as "intimate", a term which captures the 
small number of participants, their long-term interdependence, the 
closeness of their relationship and the discretion with which it 
is conducted. This feature appears in recent times to have 
shifted the balance firmly in favour of relational, as opposed to 
market contracting, as we shall see.
A second line of work was originated by Macaulay's pioneering 
1963 paper, "Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study". In this paper, based mainly on a survey of firms 
operating in Wisconsin and of some lawyers advising them, Macaulay 
posed the question of the extent to which businessmen used 
contract law. He found that the amount of planning by businessmen 
for various contingencies was highly variable; that planning for 
legal sanctions, and treatment of defective performance, in 
particular, were minimal; that exchanges were commonly made 
without any agreement on terms and conditions being reached 
(especially where the parties were using standardised forms), or 
on legally unenforceable terms, so that there was no binding 
contract at all - and that parties frequently knew this, and were 
indifferent to it; that performance difficulties were regularly 
resolved without reference to contractual obligations; and that 
dispute settlement through litigation was extremely rare. In the 
heavily-lawyered society that is the United States these empirical 




























































































mainly in the availability of effective alternatives to contract: 
standardised or pre-tested products, for example; insurance; 
non-legal sanctions, such as intra-firm pressures for quality by 
salesmen on production staff, loss of future business, loss of 
trade reputation. He also stressed the heavy costs, both in money 
and in business relations terms, that might be involved in 
creating a detailed contract and, still more, in litigating to 
enforce one. In the light of all these factors, Macaulay found it 
necessary to conclude by explaining why contract should be used at 
all, stressing such points as the value of a detailed contract as 
a communication device within the buyer or seller enterprise, or 
in cases where there was a likelihood that significant problems 
would arise (as where complex performance over an extended period 
was called for); the existence of special relationships, such as 
the manufacturer-dealer franchise, in which the normal non­
contractual controls might not operate; and the possible interest 
of third parties, like government, in seeing a formal contract 
concluded.
Subsequent empirical studies, in different legal cultures, 
have tended to confirm these findings (Beale and Dugdale, 1975; 
Kurczewski and Frieske, 1977). Reflecting on this later, Macaulay 
(1977) pointed out that despite all this empirical evidence to 
suggest the irrelevance of the classical contract process to the 
real world, the classical view of contract continued to dominate. 
What functions, then, did it serve? Two of his suggestions 




























































































"the foundation for strategic manoeuvres in the game of negotiated 
settlement" (1977: 515), and the idea that contract law might 
"crystallize business customs and provide a normative vocabulary, 
affecting expectations about what is fair" (1977: 519).
The relevance of this line of work might at first sight 
appear to be limited, since it is clear that those engaged in the 
iron ore trade have for the most part conducted their business 
under quite detailed formal contracts. Macaulay gives us grounds 
to suspect, however, that the link between contractual 
stipulations and trading behaviour may be weak, and that factors 
other than a sense of contractual obligation may be determinant. 
In examining contractual performance in the iron ore market - 
which, as already explained, is a necessary step in relating 
market stability to long-term contract - we thus have the chance 
to test these suspicions in a new arena: that of major 
international raw material contracts.
THE INCIDENCE OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
We have seen that in the early days of the steel industry the 
normal mode of procurement of iron ore was through the ownership 
of the mine. As economic local supplies became exhausted, and 
mills began to look overseas for supplies, mill ownership of 
overseas mines became quite common: in the late nineteenth 




























































































the British steel industry. United States mills undertook this 
kind of development in Canada and, later, in South America, and 
British mills were developing mines in Canada and West Africa in 
the middle years of this century. Most of these developments, 
however, did not involve 100 per cent ownership and management of 
the mine by a single mill: full vertical integration was seldom 
sought. The pattern of ownership and management was in fact often 
highly complex, particularly where United States mills were 
concerned. Mills formed themselves into consortia for the 
ownership of mines; individual mills would commonly have a less- 
than-controlling interest, and functions of mine management would 
often be undertaken by merchanting companies, which had carved out 
an important specialised role for themselves in the American 
industry, in such spheres as financing, transportation, sales, and 
mine management. This system was exported to South America also, 
though here it became more common for a single mill or, sometimes, 
a single merchanting company, to have a controlling share of the 
mining enterprise, as with Bethlehem Steel in Venezuela or Marcona 
in Peru.
In the post-Second World War expansion, ownership by steel 
mills played an even less important role. To be economic, the 
new mines needed to be large. Their output might considerably 
exceed the needs of any individual steel company; their financing 
might be beyond its capacity, which was in any event strained 
throughout the industry by the need to finance new production 
























































































































































































normally set up a joint sales agency company to which they sell 
their production and from which they buy their needs, rather than 
relying on direct separate disposal as is common in the oil 
industry.
In the phase of major development of the industry in the 
nineteen-sixties and early nineteen-seventies, the overwhelming 
preference, apparently of both buyers and sellers, was for 
procurement through long-term contracts: that is to say, 
contracts in which the quantities to be supplied (and normally the 
prices also) were fixed over a period of years. The traditional 
pattern of dealing in Europe for ore supplies other than those 
owned by steel companies - principally, supplies from Sweden - was 
one of short-term or spot contracts. The Japanese, when they 
entered the market, wanted greater security of supply than these 
contracts could provide, but as has been noted, were not anxious 
to invest heavily overseas in acquiring new mining capacity. 
Their preferred vehicle was the long-term supply contract, though 
the mills sometimes found it necessary to take small 
participations in mining consortia either themselves or through 
the Japanese merchant companies which acted as their trading 
agents. This mode of acquiring supplies quickly spread from the 
Japanese market so as to dominate non-socialist world iron ore 
trade, so that a safe estimate might now be that not less than 80 
per cent of the ore entering such trade is sold on this basis. 
Such contracts appeared to offer advantages to all classes of 




























































































the disposal of output in a period of proliferation of supply 
sources. Where sellers, as was frequently the case, were 
undertaking new mine development, they also provided collateral 
for mine finance. For buyers, who in the nineteen sixties and 
early seventies were looking forward to a period of continuing 
growth in steel demand, they guaranteed secure supplies of the 
right type through periods when the market might become very 
constricted, should mine development lag behind steel demand.
We may summarise these considerations in economic terms by 
saying that the reduction of uncertainty as to availability of 
appropriate supplies and access to appropriate markets in a time 
of expansion of both milling and mining capacity provided the main 
motivation for this massive resort to long-term contracting. By 
itself, the idea of buyer-specific investment seems insufficient 
to explain the dominance of this method of trade: appropriate 
mixes of ore inputs could be maintained by judicious short-term 
and spot buying, and the Swedish company LKAB showed over a long 
period that iron ore mining could prosper on the basis of such 
short-term arrangements. While in theory short-term contracting 
might have offered an alternative trading framework for the 
expanding industry, once long-term arrangements became established 
in a significant portion of this "intimate" market the 
attractiveness of short-term arrangements rapidly diminished due 
to the restriction of the variety and quantity of ore available on 
such terms. A snowball effect was thus initiated, which has 




























































































present day (even LKAB is now selling some ore on contracts 
extending over several years), and which it is hard to see being 
reversed in the absence of a complete breakdown of the LTC system.
On one view it may seem a little surprising that no such 
breakdown has taken place. Parties reduce uncertainty through 
long-term contracts by foreseeing a range of future possibilities 
and determining in advance their trading behaviour in such 
circumstances. One problem with this technique is the limited 
capacity of contracts to cope with future changes of circumstances 
of a kind or intensity which the parties did not foresee. If 
contracts are rigid enough to eliminate foreseen uncertainties 
they may break under the strain of unforeseen events. As we shall 
see in the next section, the LTCs of the late sixties and early 
seventies were rigid contracts. Since that time, moreover, the 
course of events affecting the iron ore market has been different 
in two fundamental respects from the expectations of the 
contracting parties.
In the first place, parties chose the U.S. dollar as the 
numeraire, or money of account, in their contracts. Given the 
gold convertibility of the dollar and the international nature of 
the market one would not have expected anything else. In 1971, 
however, the gold convertibility of the dollar was suspended and 
the dollar later devalued against most other currencies. Within a 




























































































another. This introduced a quite unexpected element of 
instability into the economic balance of the contracts, whose 
effects were exacerbated for most producers by a strong world 
inflation in the same period which exerted disproportionate 
pressures on their costs.
Secondly, in the nineteen-sixties and early seventies steel­
makers were anticipating a lengthy period of continuing growth of 
demand for steel. But from 1970 to 1982 virtually no growth 
occurred: world production of crude steel in 1970 was 599.1 MT,
in 1982 645.4 MT. The 1982 figure is lower than that for 1973.
Moreover, during this period there has been significant growth in 
the steel output of new steelmaking countries (e.g. Korea, 1.16 MT 
in 1973, 11.76 MT in 1982; Taiwan, 0.54 MT in 1973, 4.15 MT in 
1982), which has meant that the market shares of the large 
traditional buyers of iron ore in Europe and Japan have been 
squeezed even further. Japanese steel production declined from 
119.32 MT in 1973 to 99.55 MT in 1982, EEC production in the same 
period from 151.11 MT to 111.28 MT. Steel companies, therefore, 
found themselves in need of far less iron ore than they had 
anticipated when concluding their LTCs in the sunny days of the 
nineteen-sixties and early seventies.
CONTENT AND STRUCTURE OF THE LONG-TERM IRON ORE CONTRACT
To appreciate the nature and seriousness of the effect of 




























































































structure and contents of such contracts. This is not easy: the 
industry is sensitive on questions of confidentiality, and a 
number of companies approached or interviewed refused even to 
disclose individual clauses of a technical character (e.g. force 
majeure, or arbitration) used in their contracts. Nonetheless, a 
substantial number of individual and pro forma contracts have been 
collected, on the basis of which it is possible to discern the 
general pattern to which the contracts conform, normal ways of 
dealing with common contractual issues and the range of variations 
around such norms, and, not least important, the way in which the 
framing of contracts has changed over time, in response to the 
developments of the nineteen-seventies which have been summarised 
above. There is certainly no such thing as a standard contract in 
the iron ore industry, and it is doubtful whether it can even be 
said that there is a "typical" one. To convey a fair impression 
of contractual contents, therefore, I propose first to identify 
and classify the main clauses which will appear in virtually every 
contract, and then to analyse in more detail those which are of 
particular interest here: the key commercial stipulations as to 
quantity and price on the one hand, and what I shall call 
"lawyers' law" stipulations on such matters as dispute settlement 
on the other. To illustrate this detailed examination, examples 
will consistently be drawn from two specific contracts. The 
first, which will be referred to as Contract A, is an actual 
contract operative from the late sixties, and thus concluded 
before the unpredicted disturbances of the next decade. The 




























































































nineteen-eighties, that is, with the benefit of experience of this 
period. Naturally, where these contracts provide unusual 
solutions to the problems they confront, this will be indicated.
Contract clauses in general
All long-term iron ore contracts will provide for the 
following matters:
(i) Term, quantity and price: these are examined in detail
below.
(ii) Specification or quality: this will be expressed in terms
of the chemical analysis of the ore, usually by reference 
to a minimum Fe content and maximum levels for impurities 
such as potassium and sulphur; to its maximum moisture 
content; and to its physical composition (size of 
particles). Non-conformity with specification will
normally be dealt with by price adjustments (which may be 
on scales specified in advance in the contract), rather 
than by allowing the buyer any right of rejection. The 
buyer may, however, have the right to suspend shipments in 
the event of repeated quality failures.
(iii) Weight, sampling and analysis: cargoes need to be weighed,
and sampled to ensure compliance with specification. For 




























































































make reference to independent agents, such as draft 
surveyors. Recourse to an independent analyst, as umpire, 
is almost invariably provided for in the case where parties 
disagree as to the results of analysis. Actual reference 
to such third party decision in this field is regarded as a 
matter of routine, and not as a sign that a real dispute 
has arisen between the parties. Detailed terms of 
contracts in this area may also vary according to whether 
the ore is being shipped FOB (buyer's vessels) or C & F 
(seller's vessels).
(iv) Shipping arrangements: these will be set out in
considerable detail, in the contract itself or in a 
schedule. Most contracts are on FOB terms: the buyer
provides his own shipping. The contract will therefore
stipulate arrangements for the scheduling and access of
buyer's vessels, permissible delays in loading, and so on. 
FOB terms also mean that the buyer, rather than the seller, 
has de facto control over what quantities are taken and 
when. In the rarer case of C & F shipping, sellers will be 
concerned to ensure that their ships can discharge cargo 
speedily at buyer's nominated ports.
(v) Title, risk, and insurance: these provisions do not
reflect the shipping arrangements made, but are a matter of 




























































































pass to the buyer on loading but title remain in the seller 
as security for payment.
(vi) Payment: payment by the establishment of an irrevocable
letter of credit against which the seller can draw is 
probably the most usual form, though contracts calling for 
cash payments are not uncommon.
(vii) Force majeure, arbitration, assignment, notices: these
"lawyers' law" clauses are more fully discussed below.
In concentrating, for the purposes of more detailed analysis,
on term, quantity and price clauses, and on the lawyers' law
clauses, I would stress that this does not indicate the
unimportance of the other types of clause , which might be
compendiously labelled "technical". Such things as specification, 
sampling, shipping arrangements, and mode of payment are of great 
importance to the parties. Broadly speaking, however, these 
clauses will be similar in content - for transactions between 
identical parties - whatever the duration of the contract (with 
the exception of spot sales of single cargoes, which may be 
accomplished on the basis only of a telephone call and exchange of 
telexes). The clauses may well be drafted with greater care in 
LTCs and enter into greater detail. They may also be performed 
somewhat differently: buyers under a short-term contract may be 
readier to exercise a contractual right of cancellation for 




























































































LTCs, who may prefer to co-operate with sellers to remove the 
cause of the defect. Their general character, however, is not 
affected by the type of contract in which they are found. The 
opposite is true of the term, quantity and price clauses now to be 
analysed. Together, these characterise the LTC and express its 
essential features.
The term and quantity clause
In both the sample contracts, term and quantity are 
stipulated in close conjunction in the same clause. Contract A, 
provides as follows:
QUANTITY
Seller hereby agrees to deliver to Buyer 1,667,000 dry 
long tons (one long ton to be 2,240 pounds) of Sized 
Lump Ore and 1,667,000 dry long tons of Iron Ore Fines
(hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as
"Ore") during the period commencing October 1, 1969, and
terminating September 30, 1979 , according to the
following annual delivery’ schedule :
Contract Year Quantity (Dry Long Tons)
(Commencing on October Sized Lump Ore Iron Ore Fines
1 in any year and end-








































































































Buyer shall have the option to increase or decrease the 
annual delivery quantities referred to above for each 
contract year, except for 1968 contract year, by up to 
15 per cent. Buyer shall notify Seller of any exercise 
of such option at least three months prior to the 
commencement of each contract year.
Buyer shall use its best efforts to exercise such option 
in a manner which will maintain an even ratio between 
Sized Lump Ore and Iron Ore Fines in any contract year.
Notwithstanding the above option to increase or decrease 
the annual delivery quantities, Buyer shall receive the 
total contract quantity for each grade by September 30, 
1979 .
Contract B provides :
QUANTITY
SELLER shall sell and deliver to BUYER, and BUYER shall 
buy, accept and pay for during the period beginning 
January 1st, 198 and ending December 31st, 198 , the
following annual quantities of iron ore in
metric tons:
198 through 198 annually:
BUYER shall have the right to decrease the quantity of 
to be delivered and accepted during the following year 
by up to 10 per cent, provided BUYER exercises this 
option by giving SELLER notice in writing before August 
1st of each preceding year.
The close association of term and quantity is no accident: it is 
the predetermination of their relationship which distinguishes the 
LTC from other arrangements. A long-term supply contract may be 
defined as one which stipulates the delivery of a given quantity 
of product over a given period of years. What period qualifies as 
"long" will depend both on the product and on the current 
circumstances of trade. In the oil industry today one year is 




























































































seventies "long" generally connoted a span of at least ten years; 
now the consensus is the industry is rather for five, and this is 
the figure used in this paper as the minimum which justifies 
calling a contract long-term. Excluded from the category of LTCs 
for the purposes of this enguiry, therefore, are requirements and 
run-of-mine contracts, under which, respectively, the seller 
agrees to provide the whole or a given proportion of the buyer's 
requirements over a fixed period, and the buyer agrees to purchase 
the whole or a given proportion of the seller's mine output over 
such a period. Quantity obligations under such contracts will 
vary freely according to requirements and output respectively. 
They are not in fact encountered in arm's length iron ore trade, 
though the current mode of performance of iron ore LTCs is, as we 
shall see, hard to distinguish from that which would follow from 
requirements contracts.
Also excluded by definition (even though they are 
occasionally encountered) are evergreen contracts - that is, 
contracts which are automatically renewed unless one of the 
parties decides otherwise - with an initial fixed term of less 
than five years. Such contracts, even if their initial duration 
is as short as one or two years, may in fact last for very long 
periods; but by reason of the opportunities they provide for 
renegotiation on renewal they neither offer the security, nor 
impose the constraints, of the true LTC as above defined. The 
same is true, a fortiori, of short-term contracts not expressed to 





























































































the framework of a long-term course of dealing between the 
parties: a much commoner pattern of trading in this market.
Where evergreen contracts are used, or where such succession 
occurs, we may conveniently speak of long-term relations between 
the parties in question. Whether there has, in fact, been any 
difference between the behaviour of parties to LTCs and in long­
term relations is a key element in the answer, in this context, to 
our general question about the significance of legally-binding 
obligations.
The fixed-term character if iron ore LTCs is generally quite 
stark, in the sense that a majority of contracts provides neither 
for a discontinuation of the contract before the expiry of the 
term for any reason other than continued force majeure nor for the 
renewal of the contract. The force majeure clause of contract A 
(below, p. 32) is in fairly common form in providing that the 
party advised of (i.e. not invoking) force majeure may terminate 
the contract if the force majeure continues for 12 months. 
Contract B, unusually, does not even provide for termination even 
under such circumstances. Both contracts are unusual in providing 
explicitly - even if not in rigid terms - for a possible renewal:
Contract A 
EXTENSION
It is the intention of both parties to extend this 
agreement to provide for delivery of additional
Iron Ore beyond the contract period, subject to mutual 
agreement on price, tonnage and other terms and





























































































Clause 1 - Quantity
This contract runs for the period January 1st 198 to
December 31st 198 . On or before March 31st 198 ,
BUYER and SELLER shall negotiate the quantities and 
period for which the contract could be extended.
In contrast, ways of expressing quantity stipulations are 
well represented by our two examples. While contract B fixes an 
annual quantity only, contract A fixes both total quantities of 
lumps and fines over the whole contract period, and a year-by-year 
schedule of quantities. Each contract also gives the buyer, only, 
an option to vary these quantities within specified limits: in B,
down by 10 per cent in any year; in A, up or down by 15 per cent 
in any year. All contracts will have some such provision for 
limited variation of quantities in a given year at buyer's option 
(the fourchette) . , Where a total quantity is specified, as in 
contract A, the fourchette enables the buyer to smooth his intake 
of ore to reflect temporary surges or depressions in demand, to 
match the availability of shipping, and so on. In contract B the 
absence of an overall quantity provision means that the buyer may 
end up taking up to 10 per cent less than the cumulated annual 
totals provided. While this offers less security to the seller 
than the arrangement in contract A, there is an offsetting 
advantage in the absence of any upward revision option: with the
normal two-way fourchette the seller is effectively compelled to 
install capacity sufficient to satisfy the full utilisation by 




























































































Obviously the desire of buyers will be to obtain the greatest 
flexibility possible, but the width of the fourchette, and its 
impact on total quantities to be taken, will in the case of new 
mine developments be limited by the need for the contract to offer 
sufficient security to serve as collateral, de jure or de facto, 
for the raising of development finance. Lenders for iron ore 
development projects seem, however, to have been satisfied with a 
considerably weaker commitment on the part of buyers to take the 
contract quantities than has been the case in other mineral 
markets, notably that of natural gas, where it is common for 
lenders to insist on the inclusion in the contract of a "take or 
pay" provision whereunder buyers must pay the price of the 
commodity even if they choose not to take it. In the light of the 
experience of contract performance of quantity stipulations in the 
last decade, lenders may now be more demanding: LTCs relating to 
the biggest current iron ore development, at Carajas in Brazil, 
include an express warranty on the part of the buyer that in any 
year he will take at least 80 per cent of the nominal contract 
quantity. In other cases, where contracts are not lined to mine 
finance (e.g. renewal contracts for supplies from established 
mines), the opposite result in terms of contract provision has 
followed from this experience: buyers have secured the insertion 
of a "tonnage flexibility" clause permitting the unlimited 
downward revision of contract quantities in a given year either at 
the buyer's request, if he has difficulties with production or 
sales, or at the seller's, if he has difficulties in delivery. A 




























































































all contracts such reductions affect total contract quantities 
also. In present circumstances of slack steel demand and 
substantial overcommitment on LTCs by some buyers (see below), 
this clause benefits only the buyer. If total quantities can be 
reduced by invoking the clause, it arguably changes the whole 
nature of the contract, converting it from a fixed-quantity LTC 
into a requirements contract. The significance of this change 
will be discussed in the concluding paragraphs of this paper.
The price clause
Here contracts A and B present an important contrast which 
reflects the date of their design.
Contract A 
PRICE
Sized Lump Ore; US-$9.21 per dry long ton FOB spout
trimmed, Fe 64.00% base
Fines: US-$7.52 per dry long ton FOB spout
trimmed, Fe 64.00% base
The above-mentioned prices and terms specified hereunder 
shall be applicable to 833,333 dry long tons of Sized
Lump Ore, 833,333 dry long tons of Iron Ore Fines
stipulated in paragraph 2 hereinabove. The price and 
terms applicable to the remaining contract quantity of 




The purchase price or prices C & F hold of vessel at 
those ports of discharge designated by BUYER applicable 
to annual deliveries of iron ore hereunder shall be 
determined from year to year by mutual agreement between 




























































































year, representatives of BUYER and SELLER shall meet to 
establish in good faith the prices at those ports of 
discharge designated by BUYER which will be effective as 
to all deliveries called for under this contract during 
the following calender year.
In order to establish said competitive prices the 
parties hereto shall, in good faith, take into account 
the worldwide price trends for ores comparable, from the 
standpoint of quantity and quality, with the ores to be 
delivered under this agreement, the effective or 
potential availability of said comparable ores at the 
ports of discharge designated by BUYER, the FOB prices 
of said comparable ores and the ocean freight from their 
ports of origin to the ports of discharge designated by 
BUYER. Bunker escalation clause shall also be discussed 
during this meeting. It is understood, however, that 
BUYER cannot ask to be granted a lower price, if said 
lower price for the same delivery period had previously 
been offered by SELLER and was not accepted by BUYER. 
SELLER is also free to sell trial shipments not 
exceeding 100,000 tons per customer without the 
necessity to adjust the price established between BUYER 
and SELLER. As soon as agreement on price has been 
reached, BUYER and SELLER shall execute a Supplemental 
Agreement hereto setting forth ,the C & F price or prices 
and discharging conditions applicable to deliveries to 
be made under this Contract during the following year.
All dues, duties and taxes relating to the iron ore or 
transportation levied in the country of origin shall be 
for the account of SELLER. All dues, duties and taxes 
relating to the iron ore or transportation levied in the 
country of destination and/or country through which iron 
ore shall pass at BUYER'S request shall be fore the 
account of BUYER. For the definition of C & F, wherever 
mentioned in this contract, the INCO terms are 
applicable.
Contract A, concluded in 1968, has a fixed price, subject to 
adjustment for quality, for half of the contract quantity of lumps 
and fines respectively. The price for the remainder is to be 
fixed by agreement not later than half-way through the contract 
period. Such a provision is common in LTCs concluded up to around 
1974-75. Sometimes prices were fixed for a period of years (3-5




























































































quantity; sometimes more complex arrangements were made, with
split prices for proportions of each year's quantities.
Indexation has been rare, though some contracts have had prices
tied to the price of a basket of ores, to pig iron prices, and so 
on. Contract B shows the effects of the instability of the
nineteen-seventies: prices are to be negotiated annually. This
contract sets out negotiating procedure and criteria more fully 
than most, but is silent on the important question of what happens 
if the parties fail to agree a price before the date when 
deliveries for a given year are due to start. In the absence of a 
specific provision, the price once agreed will presumably apply 
retrospectively to shipments made before agreement. The contract 
may however provide that where the price cannot be agreed,
shipments for that year may be cancelled; or that, pending 
agreement, shipments are to continue at the previous year's price, 
with the new price, once agreed, being applied retrospectively 
only to a proportion of the so shipped. Some contracts smooth 
out annual fluctuations in prices by providing for review of the 
price of half the contract quantity every other year (the "brick 
pricing" system).
"Lawyers' law" clauses
Clauses of this type are few and simple in iron ore LTCs. 
Part of the reason, undoubtedly, is the small part played by 
lawyers in the design of these contracts, and, indeed, the limited 



























































































- 3 1 -
for their negotiation and performance. Despite our advance 
indication of an interest in specifically legal questions, such as 
the design of force majeure clauses, lawyers were present at only 
three of the fifteen company visits so far conducted in the 
research for this study; in only one of the other cases did 
company representatives make any spontaneous reference to legal 
advice. The low visibility of lawyers in this business confirms 
impressions collected by the earlier investigations of Macaulay 
(1963) and Beale and Dugdale (1975) into contracts mainly of 
engineering firms in Wisconsin and Bristol respectively, but is 
perhaps more surprising in view of the international character of 
the market and the very large sums of money involved.
Two possible reasons may be suggested. First, though the iron 
ore market is worldwide in scope, the total number of companies 
operating as buyers or sellers within the main currents of trade 
is small, probably not more than fifty. Within these companies 
negotiations are conducted by senior people who develop close 
personal relationships. They may be able re rely more heavily on 
personal trust and on industry mores, and feel less need of legal 
protection, than operators in larger, more impersonal markets 
. Second, although the existence of an iron ore LTC probably 
signifies a degree of interdependence between the parties 
(adjustment of processing facilities to product specification, 
construction of suitable loading and unloading facilities, 
acquisition of necessary shipping, etc.) closer to that involved 



























































































- 3 2 -
transaction, the form of the LTC appears to have developed as the 
simple extension in time of the annual or spot contracts which 
were quite recently, as we have seen, the only arm's-length mode 
of trading. It consequently shares their simplicity and their 
heavy reliance on general rules and principles, whether legal or 
custom of the trade, for guidance in the unlikely event of 
dispute. Whatever the reasons may be, the simple form of this 
part of the LTC requires that we consider both the clauses that 
are found and those which we might expect to find, but do not.
It is hard to imagine an LTC without a force majeure clause. 
The purpose of the clause, it should be remembered, is to ensure, 
within limits, the continuation of the contract in circumstances 
which, under general law, might constitute a breach on the part of 
one party, might terminate the contract by reason of impossibility 
or unforeseen onerousness of performance, or warrant its ex post 
facto adjustment by a court. To avoid these uncertainties 




Either party shall be relieved of and excused from its 
obligations to perform hereunder, during any period that 
its performance (including any performance required of 
Receivers, and/or vessels nominated and accepted under 
this contract) is prevented or delayed by inability to 
obtain a proper export or import license, act of God, 
war or threat of war, governmental restrictions or 
regulations, strike, fire, flood, or any other cause 
beyond the reasonable control of such party. In the 
event that such a force majeure condition occurs or is 



























































































- 3 3 -
the other by cable as promptly as possible and then 
submit a written advice of the force majeure condition, 
with evidence and proof if possible, within ten days 
after occurrence of such force majeure condition. 
Deliveries that would otherwise have been made hereunder 
during the period in which performance by either party 
is prevented shall be made by mutual agreement as soon 
as practicable following termination of this force 
majeure condition; provided, however, that if any such 
period continues for more than one hundred eighty (180) 
consecutive days, the party advised of the force majeure 
condition may, at its option, cancel the tonnage that 
would otherwise have been delivered during such period; 
also provided, however, that if any such period 
continues for more than twelve (12) months, the said 
party may, at its option, cancel the remainder of this 
contract.
Contract B
In the event that performance of this Contract by either 
party is delayed, interrupted or prevented by reason of 
Force Majeure including strikes, lockouts of any kind or 
other causes beyond the control of the party which is 
unable to perform, then the party concerned shall be 
excused from the performance of this contract while and 
to the extent that such party is delayed interrupted or 
prevented; it being understood that in the event of any 
such occurrence, both parties shall perform such of 
their respective duties and obligations as conditions 
may reasonably permit, and so far as reasonably 
practicable deliveries and receipts of the grade or 
grades of ore affected shall be prorated with other 
existing foreign obligations of SELLER and BUYER as the 
case may be, provided that any quantities of iron ore 
not delivered and accepted as a result of such 
occurrence shall be cancelled except as the parties ;ay 
otherwise agree in writing.
The party whose performance is affected by any such 
occurrence shall immediately notify the other party of 
the commencement hereof, defining exactly and precisely 
the nature of such occurrence and the expected duration 
and cessation.
These clauses excuse failure to perform in defined circumstances, 
and stipulate the results of such a failure: cancellation of 
tonnage under contract B, while contract A provides for 
postponement of tonnage, cancellation of tonnage and, finally, 



























































































- 3 4 -
which the force majeure condition prevails. The definition of 
force majeure events, while varying in particularity in the two 
contracts; is in both cases quite conventional and would exclude 
any possibility of claiming force majeure on the basis of major 
market changes as in cost of supply or level of product demand 
such as have in fact upset the economy of LTCs in the last decade.
With one exception only, all the contracts seen or discussed 
so far in this investigation have had an arbitration clause. 
These can vary quite widely in content, as our two examples show.
Contract A 
ARBITRATION
Any dispute which may arise hereunder and which cannot 
be disposed of by mutual agreement shall be decided by 
arbitration in the United States of America, in
accordance with current American Arbitration rules and 
procedures. Arbitration may be initiated by either 
party by giving thirty (30) days' notice in writing to 
the other of commencement of arbitration proceedings. 
Thereupon, a board of three (3) arbitrators shall be 
appointed, one of whom shall be chosen by Buyer, one by 
Seller, and a third by two (2) so chosen. If either 
Buyer or Seller fails to choose an arbitrator within 
fourteen (14) days after receiving notice of
commencement of arbitration proceedings, or if the two 
arbitrators so chosen cannot agree upon a third 
arbitrator within fourteen (14) days after they have 
been so chosen, the American Arbitration Association 
shall, upon request of either party, appoint the 
arbitrator or arbitrators required to complete the 
board. The decision of the majority of the arbitrators 
shall be final and binding upon both parties.
Contract B
ARBITRATION
Any claim, dispute or controversy, with the exception of 
non-agreement on price, arising out of, or relative to 
this Contract, the activities performed under its terms 



























































































- 3 5 -
agreement between the contracting parties, shall be 
subject to arbitration in Paris in accordance with the 
rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, 
France.
Whenever the provisions of this Clause shall apply then 
the matter shall be referred for decision to three 
referees who shall be persons fitted by the possession 
of expert knowledge for such decision.
Each of the parties hereto shall be entitled to appoint 
one referee and the third one shall be nominated by 
mutual agreement between the parties or failing such 
agreement by the President for the time being of the 
International Chamber of Commerce. All such referees 
shall be deemed to be acting as experts and not as 
arbitrators and their decision shall be final and 
conclusive.
The parties hereby expressly state that this Clause 
shall be binding upon them despite the fact that it does 
not provide detailed guidelines for the decision of the 
referees.
Normally this clause will cover all save quality disputes, 
which have their own specialised settlement procedure (though note 
that contract B excludes arbitration on price matters, and will 
provide for a "neutral" arbitration in a third country, often 
according to International Chamber of Commerce or UNCITRAL rules. 
Arbitration is regarded as a last resort: we are not aware of any 
arbitration taking place under an iron ore LTC.
While assignment and notice clauses require no particular 
attention, a word should be said about two types of clause which 
one would ordinarily expect to find in any modern long-term 
international contract. The first is a governing law clause. 
Given that the parties to the contract inhabit different 
jurisdictions one would expect them to specify what system of law 



























































































- 3 6 -
national system, whether of one of the parties or of a third 
country, or some "self-designed" law such as "the principles of 
law common to the legal systems of both parties" and other such 
formulae. Failure to specify a system will mean that the 
arbitrators, or any court before which a dispute is brought, will 
need to determine the question, applying rules which may vary from 
court to court and are far from predictable in their application. 
Contract A contains such a clause, under which substantive law of 
the State of California is to govern the construction and 
performance of the agreement. Contract B, by contrast, omits any 
mention of governing law and such omission is in fact common in 
iron ore LTCs. In these cases, I think, parties consider the 
risks of litigation too remote to justify the risks of difficulty 
in reaching agreement inherent in the attempt to choose a 
governing law.
The second type of missing clause is a hardship, or general 
adjustment clause. Such clauses represent an attempt by parties 
to plan, on a broader scale than is offered by the traditional 
force majeure clause, for supervening events which may impede 
contract performance. Frequently, this attempt takes the form of 
provision of a mechanism for adjusting the contract (whether by 
negotiation or otherwise) in the event of hardship to one of the 
parties. A recent example is in the following form:
"15. MUTUAL COLLABORATION
Both Buyer and Seller recognise a long-term relationship 
requires mutual collaboration and assistance should 



























































































- 3 7 -
Both Buyer and Seller agree that they will make their 
best efforts to solve any problem due to any such 
circumstances in the spirit of mutual understanding and 
collaboration."
Even after the disturbances of the last decade, clauses like this 
appear to be unusual. A number of companies take the view that 
such an understanding has always been an unexpressed, but vital 
part of their relationships with their opposite numbers under
LTCs, and that its contractual expression would not strengthen
its force. At the same time even those companiesi which express
this view most strongly the Japanese, for example - have
recently been anxious, where circumstances permitted, to formalise 
arrangements for dealing with certain types of "difficulty", such 
as collapse of finished product markets leading to lack of need 
for contracted quantities (the "tonnage flexibility" clause above 
referred to: see Appendix). The unilateral and discretionary 
character of this latter clause, however, arguably disqualifies 
it from consideration as a real hardship clause, and rather 
represents, as suggested earlier, a basic change in the nature of 
the contract.
PERFORMANCE UNDER IRON ORE LTCs
The pre-1975 iron ore LTC, therefore, as represented here by 
Contract A, was a simple, rigid agreement not well adapted to 
survive the major disruptions of the market which have occurred in 
the last decade. The previous section, and Contract B, convey 



























































































- 3 8 -
experience which they have applied, or will apply, in the drafting 
of new contracts. Already in the early nineteen-seventies, 
however, LTCs were in force which would cover a very high 
percentage of total iron ore demand up to 1985 or even beyond. 
The crucial question, therefore, is what happened to these 
contracts as a result of the collapse of the numeraire and the 
collapse of the steel market. Were they terminated? amended? 
breached? or, somehow, duly performed?
Currency instability and inflation
The dollar devaluation of 1971 occurred at a time when a 
substantial number of major contracts including, in particular, 
the first contracts covering the development of large Australian 
iron ore deposits, were in their first few years of operation 
under fixed price regimes. Between 1970 and 1974 the Australians 
were doubly hit: by a rapid domestic cost inflation (the
Australian index of manufacturing prices rose 37 per cent in this 
period) and by US-dollar devaluation of 25 per cent by reference 
to their own currency. Other sellers were luckier in that the 
devaluation of the dollar, in own currency terms, was small or 
even negative. It appears that the currency changes were
recognised, on all sides, as a matter for industry concern. We do 
not have information about how all parties behaved, but the 
pattern in the Australia-Japan trade appears to have been as 
follows. The mines continued to deliver, while indicating that 



























































































- 3 9 -
to operate. After negotiations the Japanese mills (which deal 
separately with each mining company, but negotiate as a cartel) 
agreed in 1973 to a price adjustment. This price adjustment was 
on the same basis for all sellers: in fact it did not fully 
compensate the Australians for their currency-related losses, and 
over-compensated the Indians, who were already receiving currency 
gains because the rupee had depreciated even faster than the 
USdollar. This adjustment was "covered", in the case of the 
Australian contracts, by a hardship memorandum signed the 
following year, whose central provisions are virtually identical 
to the "mutual collaboration" clause above cited. In the words of 
the Memorandum
"Buyer and Seller hereby reconfirm the same spirit of 
mutual co-operation and assistance and agree that in the 
event of future hardship or unfairness resulting from 
abnormal circumstances, as compared with those in 
existence at the time of the signing of the contracts, 
the two parties shall meet promptly and exert their best 
efforts to reach a solution to alleviate such hardship 
or unfairness, taking into account all relevent 
factors."
The 1973 price adjustment, and a further adjustment made in 1974, 
were incorporated as formal amendments to the contracts, but the 
hardship memorandum, it should be noted, was not. It appears to 
have been important to the buyers, at this stage, not to enter 
into such a legally binding commitment.
After another year it became clear that the inflationary 



























































































- 4 0 -
adjustments were not quickly going to disappear. The Japanese, 
after a general contractual review, agreed to formalise the de 
facto situation by moving to a system of annual negotiation of 
prices, usually according to the "brick" system. The common 
procedure, incorporated in 1976 into already existing contracts 
and still persisting, is for the parties to agree, in respect of 
half the annual contract quantity, at the end of year 1, the price 
that will apply in years 2 and 3 and the date by which (and 
perhaps the broad criteria according to which) the price for years 
4 and 5 should be agreed. A similar agreement will be reached at 
the end of year 2 in respect of the other half of the annual 
contract quantity. These agreements are then treated as 
amendments to the original contract. Though part of its raison 
d'etre has been removed by this process, the hardship memorandum, 
where concluded, is still regarded as being in force so long as 
the original contract has not expired.
Steel market collapse
Before the steel market began to crumble in the mid-seventies 
it was the policy of European mills to acquire some 65-70 per cent 
of their needs under LTCs, either from their own mines of from 
third party sellers. The Japanese were even more committed to 
LTCs: in 1971 three major mills had a total intake of 80 MT of 
iron ore and were committed to LTCs with a total basic tonnage of 
73.6 MT. Not surprisingly, therefore, when steel demand fell



























































































- 4 1 -
that they could take only quantities falling below (in some cases 
far below) the bottom limits of their contract fourchettes, or 
even to seek to cancel contracts completely. The degree of their 
distress of course varied, according to the weakness of their own 
market, the degree to which they were able to reduce their ore 
intake by cutting back on purchases under short-term contracts, 
their desire to protect their investment in captive mines, and 
their capacity, if buying as traders, to sell on excess ore on a 
spot . or short-term basis. Also varying, it would appear, was the 
degree of their attachment to their existing LTCs, with European 
buyers (who were admittedly harder hit by the steel crisis in the 
first instance) much quicker to suggest radical solutions like 
cancellation.
In the face of this chorus of hardship, the overriding 
concern of all sellers was to keep their contracts alive. They 
strongly, and largely successfully, resisted buyers' proposals to 
terminate contracts or to suspend them indefinitely. A few 
contracts were unilaterally terminated - for example when a lucky 
buyer found that he could successfully allege continuing breach of 
specification - but for the most part what emerged was a situation 
in which buyers took what quantities they could, when they could, 
under their LTCs. Over the last five to ten years this has meant 
that most buyers are normally taking less than the minimum annual 
contract quantities. To indicate the current dimensions of the 
problem, in 1982 the three Japanese mills already referred to 



























































































- 4 2 -
these contracts of 111.8 MT and a minimum permitted tonnage of 
101.6 MT.
Buyers will normally indicate to their sellers, at the 
beginning of the annual price negotiation, how much they intend to 
take, a figure which they may, or may not, adhere to in the course 
of the year (it will be remembered that most sales are FOB so that 
the buyer controls shipping). The tonnage which is "lost" in this 
way may be taken in a later year - this has rarely happened; it 
may be postponed to the end of the contract period, so that at 
this moment the contract is, in effect, extended in time; or it 
may simply be cancelled. The parties will not necessarily be 
explicit as to which of these alternatives is to operate. In 
contrast with the situation on prices, contracts have not been 
amended, other than on renewal (see below), to reflect this crisis 
situation. Sellers do not appear to regard buyers' failure to 
take a contracted annual quantity as in itself a significant 
breach of the contract, if indeed they regard it as a breach at 
all, but (with rare exceptions) they refuse to endorse the taking 
of lesser quantities by contract amendment or even by informal 
agreement, preferring to await the last years of the contract for 
a negotiation in which they will seek to recuperate "lost" tonnage 
through contract extension or quantity increase. So far, to my 
knowledge, cancellation of quantities has been agreed only in the 
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When Japanese mills came to renew their contracts, from 
about 1978 onwards, they insisted on formalising the de facto 
situation on liftings through the insertion of the "tonnage 
flexibility" clause (Appendix). We have already noted that 
whatever the quantities and fourchette written into the contract, 
this clause in effect turns the contract into one for 
requirements, rather than for fixed quantities. This is the 
factual situation obtaining even in those cases where the clause 
does not operate. One buyer, indeed, went so far as to say in 
interview that it was an unwritten rule that the buyer can only be 
asked to lift the tonnage he can reasonably be expected to 
consume, whatever his contractual commitments may be. Another 
such rule, which would certainly command widespread acceptance, is 
that every buyer must operate his programme of tonnage reductions 
fairly as between his different suppliers under LTCs. Fairness 
does not mean that all takings must be cut pro rata: sellers 
accept, within limits, the propensity of buyers to favour captive 
mines among their long-term sellers, and their need for 
appropriate mixed of ores for economical furnace operation. This 
principle of fairness is incorporated into the tonnage flexibility 
clause as a contractual obligation.
CONCLUSIONS
The experience of the iron ore industry in the last decade 
presents a wide range of lessons for the student of international 
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experience to the ideas about contract advanced by Williamson and 
Macaulay, by briefly making a few points connected with the legal 
force of contracts and the utility of legally binding obligations.
1. The modern operation of the iron ore market seems in general 
terms to correspond to Williamson's expectations about the use 
of relational contracting. As already noted, however, the 
remarkable dominance of long-term contracting at the present 
time cannot be attributed solely to his key factor of 
recurrent idiosyncratic transactions, which is present in the 
iron ore industry, but in a fairly weak form. The origins of 
this dominance lie in the preference of some major actors in 
this intimate market for relational contracting, as opposed to 
unified governance (acquisition of mines), as a means of 
reducing supply uncertainties in a period of rapid growth; 
its consolidation we may trace first to the difficulty of 
maintaining viable short-term trading arrangements in a 
truncated market, and second to the reduction of total demand 
in the market to the point where many major buyers needed less 
ore than the minimum provided for under their LTCs. These 
elements of market structure and dynamics are touched on only 
lightly in Williamson's 1979 paper, and it would doubtless be 
helpful to examine other markets involving large recurrent 
transactions among a small number of actors to see if one can 
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2. The LTCs concluded in the early nineteen-seventies and before 
were a remarkably rigid set of documents, notwithstanding 
their importance in financial terms, and the length of the 
commitments they created. This rigidity is not wholly 
explicable by the need to use many of these contracts as 
collateral for financing purposes: contracts from other
sectors, such as gas, while stricter in their "take or pay" 
obligations, usually attempt to provide in a controlled way 
for future changes in circumstances (see, e.g., Kemp (1983)). 
Williamson's suggestion that where parties are conscious of 
uncertainty they will react by providing an "elaborated 
governance apparatus, thereby facilitating more effective, 
sequential decision making" (1979: 254) perhaps overrates the 
rationality of the parties. More specifically, one may offer 
an answer on a superficial level, in line with the general 
conclusions of Macaulay (1963), by pointing to the minimal 
role of lawyers in the design of these contracts and their 
direct evolution from simple short-term contract forms. More 
profoundly, this absence from the scene of the conflict 
specialists that lawyers are suggests that the perspective of 
the parties at the time of conclusion of the contracts was one 
of co-operation rather than conflict, coupled with the 
assumption that such co-operation would of itself, without 
contractual stipulation, suffice to resolve any difficulties 
which might arise from changed circumstances. The presence of 
arbitration clauses in all these contracts at first sight 
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of "trilateral governance", but experience shows that parties 
do not in fact resort to arbitration as a mode of settlement. 
Incorporation of an arbitration clause, I would suggest, shows 
only that the parties wish to avoid the possibility that a 
dispute will come before the ordinary courts.
3. Despite their rigidity and lack of sophistication, iron ore 
LTCs are, with rare exceptions, still in place after a very 
violent shake-up in the industry. This remarkable result has 
been achieved at the expense of an almost total change in the 
character of the contracts in question. From fixed-term, 
fixed-quantity, fixed-price contracts, they have been 
converted into requirements contracts which may, through 
extension, have an indefinite term, with annually negotiated 
prices. This has been formally reflected in contract 
amendment only in regard to price, save where tonnage
flexibility has been introduced through contract extension. 
In most cases, today, the parties are performing a 
relationship different from that written in the contract, in 
which non-contractual norms, like fairness in quantity 
reductions, may be more important than contractual ones. This 
experience may be interpreted in terms of Williamson's
argument as manifesting the desire of parties to maintain as 
many elements of their long-term contractual relations as 
possible, even while altering some fundamental ones, in order 
to enjoy continuing advantages in terms of mutual knowledge 
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to provide formally for price negotiations, while leaving 
quantity negotiations to operate contrary to formal 
contractual requirements, could be seen as an interesting 
empirical demonstration of his feeling that quantity 
adjustments were less problematical than price ones (above, p. 
5) .
Other types of explanation might, however, also be offered. 
It could be argued that the pattern of contractual behaviour 
reflects changes in the relative bargaining strength of 
buyers and sellers. Buyers were forced to accede to sellers' 
demands for prices in excess of contract levels in 1973 and 
1974 out of fear of a drying up of supplies in a market that 
still seemed to be in a phase of growth. Subsequent extra- 
contractual quantity reductions, and the arrival of tonnage 
flexibility, may be seen as expressions of the dominant 
position of buyers in a shrinking market, a position 
reinforced by the introduction - again at buyers' behest - of 
annual price negotiations as the means of securing price 
adjustments, rather than any kind of indexing system. The 
leading buyers - the Japanese and, to a lesser extent, the 
Germans - have thus attained a position where they can 
bargain on price with the threat of exercise of their 
contractual or extra-contractual discretion to reduce 
quantities, a discretion constrained only by non­
discrimination requirements of a type commonly associated, in 
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situation, in which it has become artificial to make a rigid 
separation of quantity and price negotiations, offers ample 
scope for what Williamson would call "opportunistic" 
behaviour. In this connection it is worth noting that the 
Japanese mills appear to have deliberately enlarged their 
freedom of manoeuvre in the last few years by continuing to 
undertake new long-term purchase commitments even while 
taking below the minimum on existing contracts .
4. In the current - and continuing - state of the steel market, 
the only iron ore contracts likely to be performed strictly 
according to their terms are those incorporating annual price 
revisions and a tonnage flexibility clause. There must, 
however, be serious doubt about the practical enforceability 
of these contracts in the event of breach. Say a buyer 
refuses, in breach of his non-discrimination obligation, to 
take any ore in a given year from a particular supplier under 
such a contract. In order to measure the seller's loss the 
court, or the arbitrator, will need to determine both what 
price the parties would (or should) have fixed and what 
quantity the buyer would (or should) have taken. Some courts 
and arbitrators might accept this double challenge: others
might not. Without caricaturing too much we might say that 
the performable contracts may be unenforceable and the 
enforceable contracts may be unperformable. Yet in this 
unpromising situation, in which one might think that a series 
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just as well, sellers cling tenaciously to the maintenance of 
existing LTCs and the creation of new ones, and the attitude 
of the major buyers is complaisant. Sellers and buyers alike, 
moreover, are very sensitive to questions of nomenclature, and 
clearly distinguish contractual elements in their relationship 
(agreements) from non-contractual ones (side letters, 
memoranda, and so on): they show none of the indifference to 
the existence of an identifiable contract manifested by some 
of the manufacturers interviewed by Macaulay, or by Beale and 
Dugdale. How are we to explain this attachment to contractual 
form? I would make three suggestions.
First, the LTC facilitates the dealings of buyer and seller 
with important third parties. It reassures lenders - even today, 
as the Carajas development shows. It offers tidy answers to 
governments anxious for a fair return on their natural resources.
Second, it provides a fairly comprehensive set of parameters 
for the parties' regular - or irregular - dealings and 
discussions. If problems arise, say on a matter like quality, the 
LTC offers a series of elements - price, quantity, , shipping etc.
which, at least at the beginning of the negotiation, are fixed 
points of reference. In this way the contract may provide, albeit 
in a rather weak form, "the foundation for strategic manoeuvres in 
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Third, and most important, the LTC creates a privileged 
trading relationship between the parties, which is of great 
importance in times of difficult markets, of glut or scarcity, in 
the sense that it reinforces, by rendering unambiguous, each 
party's claim to remain in business relations with the other. It 
thus gives better, but not absolute, security to the trading 
position of each party.
For this purpose, however, the legal quality that counts is 
not enforceability, but formality. By using this legal form the 
parties sanctify their intentions. As one seller puts it: "The 
legal contract ... reinforces our moral position." In a glutted 
market for a product substantially interchangeable with those of 
one's competitors, and with a single, restricted set of buyers, a 































































































(1) In the event difficulties prevent Buyers from receiving 
deliveries of the tonnage to be delivered under the 
Extension Contract, or in the event that Seller is unable 
to effect the delivery of the tonnage under the Extension 
Contract, Buyers may request Seller or Seller may request 
Buyers, forty-five days prior to the commencement of each 
contract year, to reduce the tonnage to be delivered in 
the said contract year, and the party receiving the 
request shall comply.
Furthermore, at the times when Buyers submit to Seller 
the tentative monthly shipping schedules covering the 
next quarter, Buyers or Seller may request for a revision 
of such reduction in tonnage and the party receiving such 
request shall give it serious consideration in 
recognition of the long-term contractual relationship 
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(2) In the event of a reduction in tonnage to be delivered 
under the Extension Contract in accordance with item 5(1) 
hereof at the request of Buyers, Buyers shall ensure that 
Seller is treated fairly so that no discrimination or 
disadvantage in the tonnage reduction shall occur 
compared with other major suppliers and shall exert their 
best efforts so as not to bring about any reduction in 
the Seller's share of iron ore purchases by Buyers from 
major suppliers which are each supplying iron ore to 
Buyers under similar conditions.
Similarly, in the event of such reduction being effected 
at the request of Seller, Seller shall ensure a fair 
treatment of Buyers so that no discrimination or 
disadvantage shall occur as compared with other users."
Notes and references for Daintith, The Design and Performance of 
Long-Term Contracts
Notes:
1. This study has been conducted jointly with Christopher D. 
Rogers, Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of 
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Economic and Social Research Council under grant no. HR
7907/1. Factual information
market and industry is
contributions to the study
their performance is based
participants in the market, on 
interviews.
in this paper about the iron ore 
based on Christopher Rogers1 
Information on contracts and 
on contracts communicated by 
questionnaire responses, and on
2. For another positive empirical test see Palay (1984).
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